Introduction and Statement of Qualifications

I am President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
("IEER") in Takoma Park, Maryland. Under my direction, IEER produces technical studies on a wide range of energy and environmental issues to provide advocacy groups and policy makers with sound scientific information and analyses as applied to environmental and health protection and for the purpose of promoting the understanding and democratization of science. A copy of my curriculum vita is attached.
1.2 I am qualified by training and experience as an expert in the fields of plasma physics, electrical engineering, nuclear engineering, the health effects of radiation, radioactive waste management and disposal (including spent fuel), estimation of source terms from nuclear facilities, risk assessment, energy-related technology and policy issues, and the relative costs and benefits of nuclear energy and other energy sources. I have conducted numerous studies and written extensively regarding investment planning in the electricity sector, the comparative costs of nuclear power plants and other energy sources, and the safety of nuclear power.
1.3 I am the principal author of a report on the 1959 accident at the Sodium Reactor Experiment facility near Simi Valley in California, prepared as an expert report for litigation involving radioactivity emissions from that site. I am also the principal author of a book, The Nuclear Power Deception: U.S. Nuclear Mythology from Electricity "Too Cheap to Meter" to "Inherently Safe' Reactors" (Apex Press, New York, 1999, co-author, Scott Saleska) , which examines, among other things, the safety of various designs of nuclear reactors. I am also the author of Securing the Energy Future of the United States: Oil, Nuclear and Electricity Vulnerabilities and a Post-September 11, 2001 Roadmap for Action (Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, December 2001) . In 2004, I wrote "Atomic Myths, Radioactive Realities: Why nuclear power is a poor way to meet energy needs," Journal of Land, Resources, & Environmental Law, v. 24, no. 1 at 61-72 (2004) 1.4 I am generally familiar with the basic design and operation of U.S. nuclear reactors, the safety and environmental risks they pose, and the economic costs of their operation. I am also familiar with 10 CFR 52 Appendix D, which relates to AP1000 design certification, the Environmental Assessments for the revised and original AP1000 designs, and other literature relating to the AP1000 and more generally to pressurized water reactors. In addition, I have examined vulnerabilities relating to the use of zircaloy as a fuel cladding material, hydrogen generation in reactors, spent fuel pool accidents and their consequences, and other matters relating to light water reactor and spent fuel pool accidents.
1.5
I am generally familiar with materials from the press, the Japanese government, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, the French government safety authorities, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") regarding the Fukushima Daiichi ("Fukushima") accident and its potential implications for the safety and environmental protection of U. quality. More than one-and-a-half million metric tons of concrete will be needed for two AP1000 units, which in turn will require huge amounts of cement. Cement kilns emit large amounts of mercury and other hazardous air pollutants, like hydrochloric acid, hydrocarbons, and fine particulates responsible for increasing respiratory disease, so much so that the EPA has recently issued rules tightening emissions.
8 Similarly steel production from ore involves considerable pollution. According to the EPA, iron and steel production involves air emissions of carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and fine particulates, discharges of contaminants in wastewater, and generation of hazardous and solid wastes. 4.1.6 Further, on-site, the use of the construction equipment involves the use of diesel engines, which cause emissions of particulates, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides. Finally, transportation of these vast amounts of materials to the site will also directly cause similar air pollution and, indirectly, water pollution and soil pollution impacts associated with petroleum production and refining.
4.1.7 The generation of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) during construction of Vogtle 3 and 4 is irreversible and significant. For instance, the construction of two Vogtle units, which will generate on the order of one-and-half million metric tons of carbon dioxide, 10 is equivalent to the CO 2 emissions from nearly 300,000 typical cars in one year. 
4.2.1
The potential harm to Southern Co. from a stay of construction is essentially economic; indeed, if changes are ordered after substantial construction is done, Southern will benefit from a stay rather than be harmed. This is because costs to all parties involved -Southern Company, workers, ratepayers and taxpayers, will be greater in case of later backfits compared to incorporation of safety changes before licensed construction begins. The loss to its workers will be severe in case of late changes, which make an abandonment of the project more likely than early 8 EPA 2011 9 EPA Steel 2011 10 World Nuclear Association 2011. Converted from energy data provided using average US CO 2 emissions per unit of energy use. Estimates of the energy input into construction vary somewhat. The variations are likely due to different assumptions about energy inputs into the materials used and on the on-site energy use during construction. In any case, the CO 2 emissions associated with the construction of nuclear plants are very large. 11 Rounded to one significant figure.
changes, because a sudden halt to construction and abandonment will mean essentially instant unemployment for thousands of workers. This has happened many times before, in the 1970s and 1980s, when dozens of plants were cancelled due to high costs and declining growth rate of electricity use. But the financial exposure of Southern Co. is likely to be small compared to that of other parties. Southern Co. is exposed to minimal economic risk for the primary reason that Georgia electric ratepayers, not Southern Co., carry the primary financial risk for the Vogtle project. It is my understanding that under Georgia's Construction Work in Progress ("CWIP") law, Southern Co. may recover from the ratepayers all of the costs of construction for which they are responsible, including costs of delays or default, unless the cost is explicitly disapproved by the Public Service Commission for reasons of "fraud, concealment, failure to disclose a material fact, imprudence, or criminal misconduct."
12 This is very high bar for denial of recovery. Southern Co. has been given the go-ahead both by state regulators and the NRC. Therefore, it will very likely be able recover whatever its own investment may be from the ratepayers even if it abandons the project. In effect, at present, it has, as the popular saying in investment circles goes, little or no "skin in the game" in the sense that it stands to lose little, and maybe none, of stockholders money in the event of abandonment of the project. It can look forward to construction, believing that all expenses incurred are prudent and recoverable. 4.2.2 Further, the Vogtle 3 and 4 project has received a conditional commitment for a loan guarantee from the federal government amounting to $8.3 billion, and the loan will likely come from the Federal Financing Bank.
13 So, in the event Southern Co. abandons the project and defaults on the loan, the United States taxpayer carries the risk.
4.2.3
The cost of delaying construction must also be compared to the cost of delaying consideration of the Fukushima Task Force recommendations after a 12 Ga. Code Ann. § 46-3A-7(d) (2010) 13 The official description of the Federal Financing Bank is as follows: "The Federal Financing Bank (FFB) is a government corporation, created by Congress in 1973 under the general supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury. The FFB was established to centralize and reduce the cost of federal borrowing, as well as federally-assisted borrowing from the public. The FFB was also established to deal with federal budget management issues which occurred when offbudget financing flooded the government securities market with offers of a variety of government-backed securities that were competing with Treasury securities. Today the FFB has statutory authority to purchase any obligation issued, sold, or guaranteed by a federal agency to ensure that fully guaranteed obligations are financed efficiently." (Federal Financing Bank 2012, italics added.) great deal of capital has been invested, all the way to the eve of operation, as proposed by the NRC in CLI-12-02. It is very costly to retrofit a plant after it is nearly completed. This is a cost that Southern Company has previously stated that it wishes to avoid. Southern has posted on its website a statement that the NRC's current process for issuing combined construction permits and operating licenses is preferable to the previous practice of separately issuing a construction permit before the operating license, because the previous process resulted in "costly redesigns:"
The cost of U.S. nuclear power units built in the 1970s and 80s increased dramatically from original cost estimates. The nuclear industry has taken a number of steps to reduce the risk of capital cost escalations for new plants.
To avoid lengthy licensing processes and cost overruns that occurred during the construction of the current fleet of nuclear plants, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has implemented changes to its licensing process that provide for the resolution of all safety and environmental issues before construction begins. The NRC, manufacturers and utilities have worked together to make changes to help prevent price escalations experienced in the 1970s and 80's.
The prior licensing approach granted an operating license after construction was completed. During construction, it was common for licensing requirements to change, resulting in costly redesigns.
Licensing Process Today
Today's design certification process enables plant designers to secure advance NRC approval of standardized plant designs. The early site permit process also enables companies to obtain approval from the NRC for a nuclear power plant site before deciding to build a plant. And today's process provides for issuance of a combined construction permit and operating license before construction begins. Granting a combined construction permit and operating license signifies resolution of all safety issues associated with the plant. 14 4.2.4 Therefore, by Southern Company's own logic, the issuance of a stay until resolution of all safety issues would be in its interest.
Public Interest in Issuance of a Stay
4.3.1 In my professional opinion, the public interest would be served by the issuance of a stay in this case for three reasons. First, the costs of Fukushimabased retrofits may be significant, and if they are considered before construction of Vogtle 3 and 4 begins in a supplemental EIS, the cost-benefit analysis for Vogtle 3 and 4 may change and tip toward other more affordable energy sources. Second, the possibility that backfits would be ordered later in the process has been raised by the NRC itself.
15 If these backfits are postponed until after construction is well advanced ratepayers-and potentially taxpayers-will bear increased costs of delays due to redesign and backfits. Finally, issuance of a stay is in the public interest because it would be consistent with past NRC policy regarding the consideration of the implications of the Three Mile Island accident, and because considering safety improvements before construction and operation is, as a matter of policy, the most effective way to ensure that they will be implemented in a timely way. Indeed, a principal reason for issuing new regulations enabling a single combined construction and operating license, rather than two licenses, one for construction and another for operation, was to avoid the inefficiencies, delays, and high costs that typified the two-step licensing process. This is recognized by Southern Company as illustrated by the quote above. The Nuclear Energy Institute, association of the nuclear industry, has expressed a similar view:
Shortcomings of Old Licensing Process
The federal government licensed most of today's 104 U.S. nuclear power plants during the 1960s and 1970s. Commercial nuclear energy was an emerging technology, and the regulatory process evolved with the new industry. The regulatory agency issued a construction permit for a plant based on a preliminary design. Safety issues were not fully resolved until the plant was essentially complete-a process flaw that had substantial financial implications. The Task Force identified twelve overarching recommendations for improving safety of operating and new nuclear reactors. These included measures to ensure protection against earthquakes and flooding, measures to minimize potential hazards from those events and measures to improve emergency preparedness and responses. More broadly, the Task Force recommended strengthening our regulatory framework by making it more logical, systematic and coherent. Taken together, the recommendations were intended to clarify and strengthen our regulatory framework to protect against and mitigate the consequences of natural disaster, enhance emergency preparedness, and improve the effectiveness of our regulatory programs. 17 4.4.2 As Chairman Jaczko points out in his dissent, "new safety enhancements are under development, some of which I consider necessary for adequate protection…."
18 Those that are necessary for adequate protection cannot be rejected on the basis of their cost. They have not been applied to Vogtle 3 and 4. 4.4.3 As Chairman Jaczko also points out, the NRC "expect[s] to issue a number of orders imposing new requirements relating to flooding, seismic events and station blackout as well as information requests in March 2012."
19 And these are "only the initial phase" of the NRC's post-Fukushima regulatory actions. 20 The recommendations that must be implemented also include rulemakings, which by their very nature have an even broader reach. 21 4.4.4 The costs of these requirements are likely to be significant, given that protection against flooding, seismic events, and station blackout all involve changes to reactor design rather than mere administrative measures. The costs of backfits for protection against seismic events, flooding, and station blackouts will be all the more expensive if they are postponed until after significant aspects of construction are complete. As recognized in Southern Company's website statement quoted above in par. 4.2.3, as a general rule it is more costly to redesign and backfit a reactor under construction than it is to resolve all issues before beginning reactor construction. 4.4.5 For instance, if the ground acceleration for the design basis earthquake was raised to correspond to more severe earthquakes than were incorporated into the original Vogtle or AP1000 design, the same level of safety would require more robust reactors. Seismic upgrades are likely to be expensive if they are backfitted after construction is advanced or completed. The U.S. Department of Energy's "K-Reactor" at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, located just across the Savannah River from Vogtle, provides a good example of how changes in a seismic hazard analysis can drastically affect the cost of a nuclear reactor. At 3,415 megawatts-thermal, the AP1000 22 is more than a third larger than the Kreactor, which had a rated thermal power of 2,500 megawatts. 23 The K-reactor was built in the early 1950s; seismic upgrades were made after safety became a very public concern towards the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, more than two decades prior to the most recent conclusions of elevated hazards in the eastern region. The cost of these upgrades, completed in the early 1990s, was about $870 million, or about $1.3 billion in today's dollars for a single reactor that was somewhat smaller than the proposed Vogtle reactors. 4.4.6 A cost comparable to the K-reactor seismic backfit for both Vogtle units could run into billions of dollars, with additional costs for carrying the capital during the delays. Near the end of the construction process, when the two reactors would be nearly complete, Georgia ratepayers and the federal government will have an extremely large amount of capital at risk -up to $14 billion just before completion, presuming there are no cost overruns before then. At a nominal carrying cost of capital of about 10.6 percent (usual in such calculations 25 ), NRC requirements that result in delays due to design and implementation of backfits would be $20 million to $29 million per week (rounded) if the capital invested at the time the retrofit is ordered is in the $10 billion to $14 billion range. The costs of the backfits would be in addition to these costs.
4.4.7
It is important to note that the possibility of seismic upgrades to reactors in the eastern United States looms larger with the publication of a recent EPRI-DOE-NRC 2012 study. On January 31, a week-and a half before issuing the license for Vogtle, the NRC announced the publication of a study on seismic hazards in the Central and Eastern United States. 26 In announcing the study the NRC noted that "[t]he new seismic model will be used by nuclear power plants in the central and eastern United States for these re-evaluations, in addition to being used for licensing of new nuclear facilities."
27 But the NRC did not conduct this review for Vogtle 3 and 4 prior to licensing, even though Vogtle lies about 120 miles from the 1886 Charleston earthquake, a major seismic event. Moreover, it is highly important to note that the NRC announcement stated that the " [c] alculations with the new model are expected to result in a higher likelihood of a given ground motion compared to calculations done using previous models. These calculations, however, are not equivalent to a nuclear power plant's overall risk. Plant operators must combine the information from the new model with a plant's design and safety features to determine site-specific risks." It also stated that "sample calculations indicate that the largest predicted ground motions could occur in the vicinity of repeated large magnitude earthquake sources, such as New Madrid, Mo., and Charleston, S.C." 28 In view of these statements, it is clear that the plant's design and safety need to be reassessed in light of the new model on a site-specific basis.
4.4.8 If more severe earthquakes than were incorporated into the original design were required for safety, the costs could be significant and increase the attractiveness of alternatives. Protection of the Vogtle reactors against updated flood hazards could also involve significant costs, if the updated evaluations indicate the need for backfits at the Vogtle site.
Ratepayers and taxpayers will bear the brunt of costs
4.5.1 Under the Construction Work in Progress ("CWIP") law cited above, ratepayers currently contribute to the financing of construction for the Vogtle project via their monthly power bills. Taxpayers are also at risk because an $8.33 billion federal loan guarantee will secure the project if Southern Co. defaults. 29 The loan will likely be provided by the Federal Financing Bank. 30 Retrofits substantially increase costs of the project, increasing the risk of default and eroding the competitive costs of nuclear power compared to alternative forms of energy. Therefore it is in the interest of the ratepayers and taxpayers who are very likely to ultimately bear the costs of the project's failure, to issue a stay and ensure that all pertinent safety issues are resolved before construction resumes 4.6 Postponing Fukushima safety improvements until after construction severely undermines consideration of alternatives 4.6.1 If Southern is permitted to go ahead with construction of Vogtle 3 and 4 and Fukushima-related backfits are imposed after a significant amount of construction is complete, it will not be possible to evaluate whether going ahead with construction of the reactors is cost-effective. Not only are the costs of retrofits likely to be greater if they are imposed after construction has been completed --or even substantially completed --but an up-front accounting of the costs allows a comparison with other alternative energy sources that are more cost-effective. Even the Nuclear Energy Institute has acknowledged (as is clear from the quote above) that the public is deprived of timely information under the old licensing process when regulatory changes happened during construction. ("Another shortcoming of the process was that the public did not have access to the details of the design until construction was almost finished." 31 ) One of the needed details is of course, the estimated cost of the project. 4.6.2 As noted above, if seismic backfits are required at a late stage, the delays could stretch for a year or more, the backfit costs could run into billions; carrying costs of capital would add roughly a billion dollars per year of delay. The cost of power from Vogtle is already high compared to the alternatives. At $14 billion and 90 percent capacity factor, with 10.6 percent average cost of capital, a 2 percent inflation rate, and assuming no delays and cost overruns, the levelized cost of power from Vogtle at the busbar of the power plant would be about 9 cents per kWh. When the cost of transmission and distribution is added, the cost of power from the new Vogtle units would be in the range of 13 to 14 cents per kWh. This is greatly in excess of the residential electricity cost of about 10 cents per kWh in Georgia. 32 The cost of natural gas on the spot market today is about $2.50 per million Btu. At $5 per million Btu (the approximate cost of natural gas for Georgia power plants in 2010 33 ) for a long term contract delivered to the power plant, the levelized cost of power from a combined cycle power plant at the busbar would be about 6 cents per kWh, including a 2 percent inflation rate in the price of gas (capital and operating costs for combined cycle power plants based on an advanced natural gas combined cycle plant 34 ). Hence, the cost to residential customers of this power from combined cycle plants would therefore be about the same as at present, even if there were a two percent per year inflation in natural gas costs. Vogtle is already uneconomical -being about 50 percent more expensive at the busbar than combined cycle power (9 cents per kWh for Vogtle compared to 6 cents for combined cycle natural gas). This is a central reason there is no nuclear renaissance in sight. Significant cost increases are likely to be devastating to the project and reduce the growth rate for electricity. 4.6.3 Finally, to stay construction of Vogtle 3 and 4 is in the public interest because it ensures that Fukushima-related regulatory changes and backfits will be fully and adequately considered. In his dissent, Chairman Jaczko noted "is the difficulty of requiring timely compliance with new safety requirements that are not tied down in the license."
35 This in essence means that to be assured of 32 EIA 2012 , p. 65 33 EIA 2012 . Prices of natural gas have been declining since 2010. The most recent data for prices to electricity producers published by the Energy Information Administration shows a price of $4.47 per thousand cubic feet (whose energy value is a little more than one million Btu) in October 2011. (EIA Natural Gas Prices 2012). The price had fallen to $4.15 per thousand cubic feet by December 2011. In contrast, the calculation for natural gas electricity costs here actually assumes that prices will rise at 2 percent per year. 34 EIA 2010, Table 1 , estimated at 80 percent capacity factor. 35 Dissenting Opinion at 6 in CLI-12-02 implementation, safety changes should be tied to the granting of the license. This was implicitly recognized by the NRC in responding to the Three Mile Island accident, when the NRC suspended all licensing decisions while it studied the regulatory implications of the accident. In explaining his dissent, Chairman Jaczko noted that after the TMI accident there was a "comprehensive reassessment" and "a 'licensing pause' to ensure that "lessons learned from the accident were appropriately accounted for with respect to operating reactors and new reactor applications that were under review." 36 Yet, no licensing pause has followed the Fukushima accident, even though it was far more serious and severe in every respect than the TMI accident. By suspending reactor licensing while it investigated the implications of the accident and strengthened its regulations, the NRC ensured that safety improvements would be made before operation began.
Conclusion
5.1
The construction of nuclear reactors involves a vast amount of materials like steel and cement. Their production and transport creates considerable amounts of water and air pollution, including emissions of mercury, particulates, and hydrocarbons. In addition, construction causes emissions of huge amounts of CO 2 -equivalent to emissions from about 300,000 typical cars over one year. This environmental harm cannot be remedied or fixed if the new Vogtle reactors are cancelled or significantly altered as a result of Fukushima-related regulatory backfits ordered after construction is well advanced. This irreparable harm should be avoided.
5.2 Moreover, regulatory changes are in the offing as a result of the review of the Fukushima accident by the NRC and the acceptance of all the recommendations of the Task Force by the Commission. These regulatory changes will likely require changes in the reactor design for Vogtle 3 and 4. And, as noted above, such changes are far less expensive to make at the start of the process than after construction is well advanced or nearly complete. Thus, the public interest is served by staying construction while the U.S. District Court of Appeals determines if the Vogtle EIS must be supplemented to account for the lessons learned from Fukushima. The stay is all the more important, because allowing construction to continue, and then requiring backfits at a later date, puts the public's money at risk; based on present approvals, Southern Company faces little or no financial risk.
36 Id. at 11
Taxpayers, via a loan guarantee, and ratepayers via payments called "construction work in progress," will bear essentially all of the costs that are incurred if Southern Company walks away from high post-Fukushima retrofit costs after construction is well advanced.
5.3 It is far better and much more prudent, environmentally and economically, to consider the changes that will be required of the Vogtle reactor -before construction continues, not after it is well advanced or nearly complete. 
